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1. Introduction 
Many sustainability concepts have been suggested in the literature (Zagonari, 2016a). To 
develop and calibrate a sustainability model at a national level, I will refer to the ecological 
footprint produced by consumption activities (EF), and will therefore measure sustainability as the 
direct and indirect per capita use of the environment by representative individuals. Here, I define EF 
as the area of land (ha) that is required to sustain one human life based on current ecological and 
consumption conditions. 
Achieving sustainability might require technological improvements and value changes 
(Zagonari, 2016b), although changes in consumption patterns or in perceived responsibilities to 
nature, to the current generation, and to future generations, either separately or combined, might 
lead to insufficient or unfeasible solutions (Zagonari, 2018). 
Many cultural factors explain the prevailing ethics that affect these perceived responsibilities 
at a national level (Zagonari, 2015). Here, I will refer to religious ethics, and I will represent 
sustainability conditions in terms of the main characteristics of several main religions. To avoid an 
arbitrary choice of religions, I have chosen religions whose members comprise at least 20% of the 
global population that has declared a religious affiliation. Although Judaism does not meet this 
criterion, I have included it for two main reasons. First, Judaism can be formalized as an approach 
to sustainability (i.e., to maximize the welfares of both current and future generations subject to a 
sustainable use of resources) that lies between the a-growth paradigm (i.e., to maximize the current 
generation’s welfare subject to a sustainable use of resources) and the strong sustainability 
paradigm (i.e., to maximize the welfares of both current and future generations subject to an inter-
generational equity in the use of resources) (Zagonari, 2018). Second, Judaism seems to represent a 
sustainability approach that is closest to the lifestyles currently prevailing in Western countries and 
that is increasingly being adopted by other countries (Mathevet et al., 2018). 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of the impact on sustainability of the main 
religious environmental ethics within a single framework that accounts for changes in the relative 
importance attached to consumption from using the environment vs. perceiving the environment as 
a form of bonding social capital (Christoforou, 2013; i.e., the instrumental value for meeting human 
needs vs. the intrinsic value of nature). I will also account for anthropocentric vs. biocentric 
approaches (i.e., the relative moral status of both human and non-human life and the “dignity” of 
the environment; Maintenay, 2011), for intra- vs. inter-generational equity (i.e., fair distribution of 
uses of the environment, of welfare, or of consumption goods between present and future 
generations), for population dynamics, and for the perceived needs of humans in terms of 
consumption goods, welfare, or use of the environment. In this analysis, I have three main goals: 
1. to empirically assess the feasibility of sustainability solutions that depend on religious 
environmental ethics at a national level (e.g., can Muslim countries achieve sustainability by 
relying on Islamic environmental ethics, despite the current unsustainable status?); 
2. to theoretically discuss the consistency of the required emphasis on some aspects of the 
environmental ethics with the need to achieve sustainability (e.g., can Buddhist countries rely 
on an increased importance attached to the environment as a form of bonding social capital or 
rely on the dignity of non-humans, such as whether the lives of animals have value, to achieve 
sustainability if the importance attached to consumption increases?); and 
3. to empirically assess the effectiveness of alternative religious environmental ethics for 
achieving sustainability solutions at a global level (e.g., which set of religious environmental 
ethical principles is most likely to achieve global sustainability if countries converge on a 
similarly unsustainable status?). 
Note that considering religious rather than secular environmental ethics amounts to moving 
from suggestions to prescriptions and proscriptions. Moreover, I have consulted original religious 
texts such as the Hindu Veda, Purana, and Mahabarata, the Buddhist Tipitaka, the Jewish Old 
Testament, the Christian New Testament, and the Islamic Qur’an in order to identify clear and 
incontestable readings that describe the sources of a religion’s environmental ethics. Needless to 
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say, the interpretation of Genesis 1 and 2 is based on the Cartesian disjunction between the human 
and natural worlds (Simkins, 2016), and I have adopted this interpretation for two main reasons. 
First, this disjunction lets us distinguish Judaism, with reference to Genesis 2 (i.e., humans as 
“stewards” for future generations), from Christianity, with reference to Genesis 1 (i.e., humans as 
“dominators” or “masters” over other forms of life), which in turn lets us statistically test the 
statement by White (1967) that “Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of 
indifference to the feelings of natural objects”, based on humans as separated from nature, humans 
created in the image of God, and humans as dominant over nature. Second, this disjunction lets us 
distinguish concepts such as the rights of current and future generations from the rights of non-
humans (Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina, 2015), intra- and intergenerational egalitarianism from 
interspecies egalitarianism (i.e., whether Earth’s resources should be proportionally or equally split 
between humans and non-humans) (Kopnina, 2016), and human altruism from biospheric altruism 
(altruism focused on humans from altruism focused on the biosphere) (Kopnina et al., 2018). We 
can then properly apply only the former concepts (i.e., rights of current and future generations, 
intra- and intergenerational egalitarianism, and human altruism) to achieve global sustainability, 
whereas the latter concepts (i.e., rights of non-humans, interspecies egalitarianism, and biospheric 
altruism) can be suitably combined in the intrinsic value of nature and in the perceived human 
responsibilities or duties to the rest of nature (Zagonari, 2018). In consulting the primary texts 
myself in search of the main relevant principles, I hope to avoid the disputable relative status of 
subsequent religious sources for the different religions as well as debate over the relative grade of 
alternative exegetic interpretations of the same environmental ethics in different versions of a 
sacred text (Jenkins, 2009). To limit the scope of the analysis, I have not included an analysis for 
the indigenous religions of Africa and other parts of the world because these religions are based on 
oral traditions and provide no canonical texts that can be used as the original source of inferred 
parameter values. Finally, considering religious principles rather than environmental practices lets 
me avoid rankings of secular environmental policies at a national level by focusing on attitude 
changes based on each religion’s sacred texts. 
In particular, I will provide analytical and numerical solutions that characterise the main sets 
of religious environmental ethics, moving from an extreme individual perspective (i.e., that the 
environment should be preserved in order to achieve the largest possible consumption for 
individuals in current and future generations) to an extreme communal perspective (i.e., that the 
environment should be preserved because people receive happiness from being members of a local 
or global environmental community). Moreover, the analysis is based on the following 
specifications: 
 Efficiency (i.e., the maximum output for a given use of the environment or the minimum use 
of the environment for a given output) is taken as a given, and is measured based on current 
technology rather than based on technological extrapolation. However, I will also explore the 
implications of improved technology that mitigates the impact on the environment. 
 Equity (here, a fair distribution of something) applies to both current and future humans, but 
not to non-human life. Note that equity can become a sustainability solution if it is applied to 
both current and future generations, but it is a problem that can prevent sustainability if it is 
applied only to the current generation (i.e., there is no global sustainability problem if all 
countries, apart from the United States, consume at per capita rates like those of Bangladesh, 
but a global sustainability problem arises if all countries attempt to consume at per capita rates 
like those of the United States). 
 Justice (i.e., positive or negative rights to something) applies to current humans, but not to 
future humans or to non-human beings, although I consider a sense of duty towards future 
generations or the environment and a sense of the dignity of non-human lives (i.e., different 
rights imply different perceived dignity, but not vice-versa). 
Finally, I will develop analytical and numerical solutions that depend on current and future 
population sizes and perceived needs, both in terms of (current) welfare and in terms of (current) 
use of the environment, because these parameters are likely to change in time and space. 
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Note that my formalisations let us identify which aspects are shared by which religions. For 
example, Catholicism recently extended the dignity of the humans to the rest of creation, which 
seems to move Catholicism towards Hindu prescriptions. Moreover, seeking a universalist approach 
(i.e., the same approach for everyone) would postpone cooperative action until there is consensus 
on the worldview, whereas an approach based on each religion’s code of ethics can be supported 
and implemented at a community level, with each religion relying on its own principles in the 
absence of a global consensus (Lai, 2011). Finally, my formalisation enables us to distinguish 
similar aspects of some religious ethics. For example, the imperfect and created sacred nature that is 
defined in Judaism can be depicted by the small importance attached to the environment as a form 
of bonding social capital, whereas the perfect and uncreated sacred nature that is defined in 
Buddhism can be depicted by an extension of the same dignity to human and non-human beings. 
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is the representation of the main religious 
environmental ethics within a single mathematical framework and based on measurable variables, 
to allow both numerical and statistical analyses that will compare the feasibility, effectiveness, and 
replicability of different religious environmental ethics in the context of efforts to achieve local and 
global sustainability in similar contexts (e.g., if a more equal income distribution is achieved in the 
future) or alternative contexts (e.g., pre-industrial, industrial, or post-industrial economies). Note 
that the purpose of a mathematical approach is to make the analysis more objective once the 
underlying subjective assumptions have been clearly defined, thereby allowing future researchers to 
modify the assumptions if they want to explore what changes. Moreover, an overall mathematical 
framework permits objective comparisons, and it can subsequently be expanded in future research 
to compare different schools of thought within a religion or different cultures. Finally, the purpose 
of quantification is to improve the objectivity of an analysis, thereby revealing new insights by 
harnessing the power of mathematics and statistics to detect key factors or processes that might 
otherwise be missed. 
2. The theoretical framework 
In this section, I will characterise the main religious environmental ethics. All alternative 
religious environmental ethics considered in this study will use the following welfare function (Wi) 
for a representative individual i: 
𝑊𝑖[𝑋𝑖(𝐸𝑖), 𝑌𝑖(𝐸𝑖)] = 𝑋𝑖
α𝑌𝑖
ν 
A Cobb-Douglass (CD) utility function where Xi depicts the consumption of goods, Ei represents 
the use of the environment, Yi depicts the involvement in the individual’s community, α represents 
the importance attached to consumption, and ν represents the importance attached to the 
community. I use EF as the measure of E. Moreover, since this analysis focuses on the impacts on 
and from the environment, X is positively correlated with E (i.e., a larger consumption requires a 
larger use of the environment) and Y is negatively correlated with E (i.e., a larger community 
involvement implies a smaller use or a larger conservation of the environment): 
X = λ E and Y = (μ/E) 
Where λ represents the level of environmental technology (i.e., the extent to which consumption 
affects the environment), and is expressed as the gross domestic product per unit of EF, and μ 
represents the importance attached to the environment within the community (i.e., the extent to 
which the environment represents a community, where a community could be built on alternative 
combinations of values, such as dynasty, faith, justice, and solidarity. Finally, all alternative 
religious environmental ethics considered in this study will refer to the following normalisation: α + 
ν = 1 so that α and ν represent the relative importance of consumption vs. community. 
Note that the use of a CD utility function implies that it is not possible to survive without 
consumption of goods or without environmental involvement. Moreover, the environment is not 
defined as a neo-classical collective good (i.e., so that there is rivalry in consumption, and no 
excludability from consumption), but is instead defined as a form of neo-institutional social capital 
(i.e., so that community feeling towards the environment can be both complementary and 
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substitutive of this social feeling). Finally, the use of a CD utility function allows the estimation of 
α in terms of the proportion of the total budget allocated to consumption. 
Some religious environmental ethics considered in this study will refer to the following 
welfare function (WC, with C representing the current generation here and in subsequent variable 
names) for representative individuals i and j of the current generation: 
𝑊C = [𝑊i
1−ε +  𝑊j
1−ε]
1/(1−ε)
 
This represents a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function where W represents the 
individual’s welfare and ε represents the aversion to intra-generation inequality. 
Other religious environmental ethics considered in this study will refer to the following 
welfare function (W) for representative individuals of current and future generations (hereafter, F in 
variable names): 
𝑊 = [(𝑛C 𝑊C)
1−ζ + (𝑛F 𝑊F)
1−ζ]
1/(1−ζ)
 
This represents a CES utility function where nC represents the number of people in the current 
generation, ζ depicts the aversion to inter-generation inequality, and nF represents the number of 
people in the future generation. Note that the use of a CES utility function allows the estimation of ε 
and ζ in terms of the Atkinson inequality measure. Let us normalise nC to 1, and simplify the 
notation by replacing nF with n, where n ≠ 1 if the population changes; and let us introduce the 
normalized term mC, with mC ≥ 1 representing the number of humans plus non-humans with the 
same dignity in the current generation, and simplify the notation by replacing mC with m. 
Note that formalisation of parameter values based on sacred texts requires both precision (to 
ensure that the results are reliable) and simplification (to eliminate the need to account for doctrinal 
differences among the different groups within a religion). I will therefore group some religions 
based on certain philosophical similarities that make them more similar than different from the 
perspective of the overall analytical framework, and provide examples from the relevant texts so 
readers can assess the consistency of the simplifications with these texts. Moreover, some religious 
moral precepts related to nature will be represented as objectives (e.g., human dominion over other 
forms of life in Jewish texts becomes the goal of maximizing inter-generational welfare), some 
religious moral norms related to nature will be depicted as constraints (e.g., the trusteeship of the 
environment for future generations in Islamic texts becomes a sustainability condition to be met), 
and some religious moral precepts related to nature will be represented as parameters (e.g., the 
sacred creation in the Eastern Orthodox texts becomes a large μ). However, I will disregard the 
relationships between divine precepts and natural laws (i.e., to what extent divine laws are 
translated into the natural order), and will disregard the relationships between religions and politics 
(i.e., to what extent divine moral norms are or should be translated into social behaviour or social 
order). Finally, I will measure sustainability based on the EF at the current world population level 
(θ), and will assume that the future welfare level will be larger than or equal to the current observed 
level (WC). Let us simplify the notation by replacing WC with w, and use it as a reference for future 
generations. 
In summary, feasibility is represented by pairs of α and μ values that meet the sustainability 
condition θ for alternative values of m, n, ε, and ζ in alternative contexts, for a given level of w, 
with λ estimated at the current national or mean global level of environmental technology. An 
increase in α means a larger relative importance attached to individual consumption than to 
community involvement, whereas an increase in μ means a larger importance attached to the 
environment within the community. 
Some methodological remarks are noteworthy here. The model employed in this study (i.e., 
the utility functions used to represent preferences) can be justified both theoretically and 
empirically. In terms of its theoretical foundations, one should use a CD utility function whenever 
the preferences for a set of items are likely to be almost constant. Here, values such as the relative 
importance of consumption (α) vs. community (ν) are likely to change slowly, if at all. 
Consequently, an almost constant proportion of the total budget will be allocated to these items 
(here, to consumption goods). Whenever items for which preferences are expressed can be 
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considered to be pure substitutes, pure complements, or mixed substitutes and complements (here, 
the welfare of current and future generations), one should use a CES utility function. In terms of the 
model’s empirical foundations, the proportions of the total budget allocated to environmental 
conservation (below, obtained from national statistics and expressed as a percentage of GDP) can 
be used to estimate all parameters of the CD utility function (i.e., α and ν, once the values have been 
normalized such that α + ν = 1). This can be done by relying on the optimal solution of the usual 
utility maximization problem subject to an income constraint in the case of a CD utility function. 
For instance, the optimal expenditure for an item associated with α in the CD utility function is 
given by [α/(α + ν)] y, where y is the available income. The degree of aversion to intra- and inter-
generational inequality (below, assumed to depict alternative religions) can be used to estimate all 
parameters of the CES utility function (i.e., ε and ζ) by relying on the one-to-one relationship 
between the Atkinson inequality measure and a CES utility function, in which welfare increases if 
inequality decreases. In particular, the Atkinson inequality measure is given by 1–[(1/k)∑(xi/x*)
1–
ε
]
1/(1–ε)
 with xi representing the value of item i, x* representing the mean of the total of k items, and ε 
representing the inequality aversion parameter. 
2.1. Hinduism (including Jainism) 
In Hinduism, the Bhagavad-Gita of the Mahabharata (5:18) states “See the presence of God 
in all, and treat all species with respect”; in the Vishnu Purana (3:8:15), “God, Kesava, is pleased 
with a person who does not harm or destroy other non-speaking creatures or animals”; in the 
Atharva Veda, “Preserve the original fragrance of Earth” (mantras 23 and 25) and “Mother Earth, 
like a Cosmic Cow, gives us the thousandfold prosperity without hesitation without being outraged 
by our destructive actions” (mantra 45); in the Vanaparva of the Mahabharata (25:16), “All 
creatures act according to the laws of their specific species-behaviour as laid down by the creator. 
Therefore, none should act in the adharmic way”; in the Shantiparva of the Mahabharata (109:10), 
“Dharma exists for the general welfare of all living beings”; also in the Shantiparva (139:22), “An 
action which has been committed by a human being in this life follows him again and again” and 
(129:21), and “Although a particular person may not be seen suffering the results of his evil actions, 
yet his children and grandchildren as well as great-grandchildren will have to suffer them”. 
In summary, the emphasis is on stewardship, an extended family (i.e., humans, animals, and 
all living beings) of Mother Earth, respect (based on the cycle of birth and rebirth) up to reverence 
(based on the incarnation of the supreme being) for other animal species, harmony with all divine 
creations, ensured (greater than some minimum) wealth to everybody, together with ecological 
spirituality and individual punishment in future reincarnations or in future generations in the case of 
actions that contravene the rules of dharma (Dwivedi, 2006; Jain, 2009; Kala and Sharma, 2010; 
Smith, 2011). Mathematically (where HIN represents the value for Hinduism): 
𝑊𝑖 = (λHIN 𝐸𝑖)
α (μ/𝐸𝑖)
1−α 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐸𝑖 ≤  θ 𝑚⁄  and 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤HIN 
With m ≥ 1. Thus, solutions can be represented as follows: 
αHIN ≤
ln[𝑤HIN] − ln[(𝜇 𝑚) θ⁄ ]
ln[(θ λHIN) 𝑚⁄ ] − ln[(𝜇 𝑚) θ⁄ ]
 , αHIN ≥ 0 , αHIN ≤ 1, μ ≥ 0 
In Jainism, based on the five vows that define Jain practice and that are taken up in the exact 
same order in the Yoga Sutras, one can read “[vow I] non-violence: abstaining from harm to any 
being that possesses more than one sense, requiring a strict vegetarian diet; [vow III] not-stealing: 
not only to not take more than is offered, but also not to take more than is needed; [vow V] non-
possession: one owns only the bare necessities of life”. In summary, this proposes a lifestyle that 
goes farther than that of the deepest ecologists (Chapple, 2006). Mathematically: Ei ≤ s < θ, where s 
is the subsistence-level use of the environment. However, this minority religion (i.e., 0.3% of the 
world’s population in 2012) will be disregarded in the remaining analysis because it would be 
infeasible to extend it to a large population. Similar formalisations can be made for Sikhism (Tanner 
and Mitchell, 2016). 
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2.2. Buddhism (including Confucianism and Daoism) 
In Buddhism, one of the Buddha’s Four Noble Truths explains that human suffering is 
generated by desire and attachment, and that one remedy for such suffering is the practice of 
compassion and loving-kindness. These practices, included in the Buddha’s Eightfold Path, lets us 
interpret some basic Buddhist principles as a core foundation of environmental concern (Sutta 
Pitaka of the Tipitaka): non-harming means the absence of desire to kill or harm, and applies to all 
beings. In particular, “If one eats the meat of beasts that one has killed or one has caused another to 
kill, one must spend a hundred thousand kalpas in hell” (i.e., 100 000 lifetimes) according to the 
Veludvareyya Sutta. Moreover, “If people err (i.e., greed, hate, ignorance) in their ways, the 
richness of the Earth declines, whereas moral virtues (i.e., generosity, compassion, wisdom) are 
able to reverse the environmental decline” (Adhammika Sutta). In particular, one should not put 
human waste into or spit into water. Finally, “Who has no attachment towards anything, therefore 
he loves the environment” (Arahatta Bhikkhu). In particular, a goal is to seek out calm places for 
meditation in forests in order to distance oneself from desires. 
In summary, the focus is on harmony with nature’s laws, and compassion and loving-kindness 
extended to all beings, together with preservation of nature for its aesthetic value, and both 
individual and social future punishment in cases of detrimental actions (Kaza, 2006; Shaw, 2017). 
Mathematically (where BUD represents the value for Buddhism): 
𝑊𝑖 = (λBUD 𝐸𝑖)
α (μ/𝐸𝑖)
ν 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐸𝑖 ≤  θ 𝑚,  𝐸𝑖 ≤ 𝑒BUD,⁄  and 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤BUD 
Where m > 1, and where eBUD and wBUD represent the needs in terms of the use of the environment 
(e.g., human waste) and in terms of welfare (e.g., human and non-human pain), respectively. Note 
that escaping from the world would imply a small α. Thus, similar precepts related to environmental 
actions characterise Buddhism and Hinduism, although sometimes they have different foundations 
(e.g., respect for animals in Hinduism is based on animals having been humans in a previous life or 
humans becoming animals in a subsequent life, whereas respect for animals in Buddhism is based 
on them suffering like humans in their current life). This suggests that the equilibrium 
environmental solution presented in Section 2.1 for Hinduism can be used for Buddhism. Here, I 
have used equilibrium to represent the result after accounting for the offsetting effects of all 
variables simultaneously, where sustainability is maintained in each time (i.e., a steady-state or 
static equilibrium). 
Confucianism has been considered to be a social code of ethics (i.e., social rules to live 
harmoniously with other human beings) rather than a religion, because it lacks a strong sense of 
ultimate transcendence in an afterlife. Nonetheless, it shows a great concern for human well-being. 
If we focus on the 13 classical canons by Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, in the Analects (a 
discussion of ethics), we can read “A youth, when at home, should be filial, and, abroad, respectful 
to his elders”. In addition, “In serving his parents, a virtuous man can exert his utmost strength; in 
serving his prince, he can devote his life”; and in the Yijing (a discussion of cosmology), “Yin and 
yang are the underlying principles of heaven and Earth; they are the web that holds all ten thousand 
things secure; they are father and mother to all transformations and alterations; they are the source 
and beginning of all creating and killing”. In summary, nature is ultimately composed of one source 
of energy (Qi); harmony arises from the constant generative action of Yin and Yang; and social 
order and balance arise between humanity and nature in large ecological systems, together with love 
for natural beauty (Berthrong, 2006; Clippard, 2016). Mathematically: 
𝑊𝑖 = (λ 𝐸𝑖)
α (μ/𝐸𝑖)
ν 𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝐸𝑖 ≤ θ 
Where the weighted sum refers to the relevant (local) community, with ri as the relative weight for 
individual i. Thus, similar precepts related to environmental actions characterise Buddhism at the 
individual level and Confucianism at the community level. This suggests that the equilibrium 
environmental solution presented above for Buddhism can be used for Confucianism if the analysis 
is performed at the country level. 
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In Daoism, the Hua Hu Ching (a discussion of ethics) provides: “These time-honoured 
disciplines calm the mind and bring one into harmony with all things; Acceptance is the very 
essence of the Tao; Foregoing antagonism and separation, one enters in the harmonious oneness of 
all things; The universe as a harmonious oneness; Simply be aware of the oneness of things.”. In 
The Way and Its Power (a discussion of cosmology), “[the Universe is a complex of] ways [that] 
take as their model their own capacity for self-generation”. In summary, the focus is on harmony 
with nature, with nature perceived as a flux; on human health, perceived as an equilibrium between 
the body and its environment through its nine orifices; and on nature, as self-generated objects 
moving towards an equilibrium (Harry, 2012; Miller, 2006). Note that Daoism is consistent with the 
theory of evolution and with the ecosystem approach to sustainability. Mathematically: Ei ≤ s < θ 
where s is the subsistence-level use of the environment. However, I will not further consider this 
minority religion (i.e., 0.1% of world population in 2012) because it is infeasible to extend it to a 
large population. Similar formalisations are possible for Shinto (Francis, 2014). 
2.3. Judaism 
In the Old Testament, Genesis (2:15) provides the following: “And the Lord God took man, 
and put him into the paradise of pleasure, to dress it, and to keep it”; in Leviticus (25:3-5), we read: 
“3. For six years you shall sow your field, and for six years you shall care for your vineyard, and 
you shall gather its fruits. 4. But in the seventh year, there shall be a Sabbath of the land, a resting 
of the Lord. You shall not sow your field, and you shall not care for your vineyard. 5. What the soil 
shall spontaneously produce, you shall not harvest. And you shall not gather the grapes of the first 
fruits as a crop. For it is a year of rest for the land to care for the land”. In Deuteronomy (25:4): 
“You shall not muzzle an ox as it is treading out your crops in the field”. In Psalms (19:1): “The 
heavens are telling the glory of God/and the firmament proclaims his handiwork”. In Deuteronomy 
(11:17), “And the Lord, becoming angry, might close up heaven, so that the rain would not descend, 
nor would the Earth produce her seedlings, and then you would quickly perish from the excellent 
land, which the Lord will give you”. In Deuteronomy (20:19), “When you will have besieged a city 
for a long time, and you will have encircled it with fortifications, so that you may fight against it, 
you shall not cut down trees from which one is able to eat, neither shall you cause devastation with 
axes to the surrounding region”. In Leviticus (19:19), and similarly in Leviticus 10:10-11 and 
Deuteronomy 22:11, “you shall not let your cattle breed with a different kind; you shall not sow 
your field with two kinds of seeds”. In Leviticus (27:27), “The firstborn, which belongs to the Lord, 
no one is able to sanctify or vow, whether it is an ox, or a sheep, they are for the Lord. In Leviticus 
(27:30): “All the tithes of the land, whether from grain, or from the fruits of trees, are for the Lord 
and are sanctified to him. In Deuteronomy (14:3-6), and similarly in Leviticus 11: “3. You shall not 
eat the things that are unclean. 4. These are the animals which you ought to eat: the ox, and the 
sheep, and the goat, 5. the stag and the roe deer, the gazelle, the wild goat, the addax, the antelope, 
the giraffe. 6. Every beast which has a hoof divided into two parts and which also chews the cud, 
you shall eat.” In Psalms (144:15-16), and similarly in Psalms 147:9, “O Lord, all eyes hope in you, 
and you provide their food in due time. You open your hand, and you fill every kind of animal with 
a blessing”. Note that I returned to the original texts in order to identify the main ethical principles, 
although I am aware that Jewish practical ethics rely on the Halakhah, which is derived from the 
Torah through years of debate among senior rabbis. 
In summary, humans are seen as “stewards” for future generations, and nature is never an 
end, but rather it points to the divine creator who governs and sustains it. God is the rightful owner 
of the land of Israel, and Israelites are God’s tenants; social punishment is provided for sins; and 
there is an emphasis on preservation of vegetation and conservation of fruit trees for future use, on 
protection of biodiversity, and on limited consumption of some animals for unspecified reasons; and 
there is clear evidence of the use of fallow agriculture to restore soil nutrients, improve the soil, and 
maintain vigorous plants (Tirosh-Samuelson, 2006). Mathematically (where JUD refers to the value 
in Judaism): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤JUD and 𝐸𝑖 ≤ θ with ζ = 1 and ε = 0 
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Thus: 
𝑊C = (λJUD θ)
α
 (μ/θ)1−α = 𝑤JUD = 𝑛 𝑊F  𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤JUD and 𝐸𝑖 ≤ θ 
The solutions can be represented as follows: 
αJUD ≤
ln[𝑤JUD 𝑛⁄ ] − ln[μ θ⁄  ]
ln[λJUD θ] − ln[μ θ⁄ ]
, αJUD ≥ 0 , αJUD ≤ 1, μ ≥ 0 
Note that an increase in the population (i.e., n > 1) makes the sustainability conditions stricter 
(i.e., a lower αJUD for each μ), although in Deuteronomy (14:21) one can read “But whatsoever 
[animal] is dead of itself, eat not thereof. Give it to the stranger, that is within thy gates, to eat, or 
sell it to him”. Similarly, on the 7th year, debts contracted by fellow Israelites are to be remitted 
(Deuteronomy 15:3). Thus, the concern seems to focus on Jewish future generations rather than on 
all human future generations. Moreover, the formalised rules refer to inter-temporal optimal use of 
natural resources rather than to preservation of nature, although the abovementioned text describes 
the proper treatment of soil, animals, and vegetation with the goal of maintaining their productivity. 
Indeed, Deuteronomy (22:6-7) states “6 If thou find as thou walkest by the way, a bird's nest in a 
tree, or on the ground, and the dam sitting upon the young or upon the eggs: thou shalt not take her 
with her young: 7 But shalt let her go, keeping the young which thou hast caught: that it may be 
well with thee, and thou mayst live a long time”. Similarly, “during the first three years of growth, 
the fruits of newly planted trees or vineyards are not to be eaten” (Leviticus 19:23). In other words, 
the whole second creation story in Genesis (2:7-15) is likely to have been introduced when the 
Jewish people transformed from a nomadic population to a sedentary population based on 
agriculture, in order to face the environmental problems created by agriculture, such as land 
degradation and desertification, since the food risk cannot be spread over large areas as nomads can 
do. In contrast, the first creation narrative (Genesis 1:1-23) depicts the creation of the material 
world as an act of imposing order on unordered chaos by serving as a rationale for the distinction 
between the sacred and the profane. Finally, nature (i.e., God’s creation) is viewed as presently 
imperfect (i.e., it needs to be redeemed together with the people of Israel), and human management 
and care, according to divine commands (i.e., God’s revelation), are required to sanctify nature. In 
other words, nature is not inherently sacred or worthy of veneration, although domestic animals are 
included in the Sabbath day of rest (Deuteronomy 5:13-14), and, consistently, rabbinic Judaism 
called on Jews to aspire to transcend nature. Thus, a large commitment to nature (μ) as a form of 
social bonding capital is difficult to achieve. 
2.4. Christianity (Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestantism) 
In the New Testament (Matthew 6:26) one can read: “Behold the birds of the air, for they 
neither sow, nor do they reap, nor gather into barns: and your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not 
you of much more value than they?” There are similar words in Luke (12:24). Matthew (6:32) says: 
“For after all these things do the heathens seek. For your Father knoweth that you have need of all 
these things”. In Corinthians (7:31), “And they that use this world, as if they used it not: for the 
fashion of this world passeth away”. In the Book of James (3:7): “For every nature of beasts, and of 
birds, and of serpents, and of the rest, is tamed, and hath been tamed, by the nature of man”. In 
summary, humans are seen as “dominators” or “masters” over other forms of life, with no 
constraints, so that all needs are satisfied (Riley, 2017). Mathematically: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊C 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤 
In other words, Christians adopted the first creation story in Genesis (1:26-28): “28 And God 
blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it, and rule over the 
fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all living creatures that move upon the Earth.” 
Note that in the Old Syriac Gospel by Luke, Jesus is quoted as saying: “Now beware in 
yourselves that your hearts do not become heavy with the eating of flesh and with the intoxication 
of wine and with the anxiety of the world, and that day come up upon you suddenly; for as a snare it 
will come upon all them that sit on the surface of the earth”: in other words, humans and non-
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humans have the same dignity or moral value, and this suggests a vegetarian diet; this amounts to 
the Hindu perspective. 
For Catholics, St. Augustine tells us, “Though not required for furnishing of our house, these 
things [all creatures] are necessary for the perfection of the universe” (De Ordine). Similarly, St. 
Thomas tells us, “As those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst 
each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe” (Summa Theologica). In 
summary, nature is to be admired by Christians, nature is provided by God as a common good for 
meeting human needs (instrumental values), and imperfect nature needs to be altered by human 
hands (Hart, 2006; Schaefer, 2009; Warner, 2008). Mathematically: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊C 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤 with ε = 0 
Note that the first mention of “social injustice” appears in the Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo 
XIII (1891), and this supports ε = 0, whereas a more recent emphasis places caring for the 
community (e.g., in Latin America) before caring for creation. Moreover, m = 1 represents the 
belief that humans and non-humans are incommensurable (i.e., they must be judged by different 
standards). Indeed, Pope St. John Paul II (1990) wrote, in Peace with God the Creator, Peace with 
all of creation, that “respect for life and for the dignity of the human person extends also to the rest 
of creation” or, similarly, that “Christians realise that their responsibility within creation and their 
duty toward nature and the Creator are an essential part of their faith”. In other words, Catholics 
seem to move towards Hinduism (i.e., 1 < m < ∞), without mentioning sustainability, although the 
moral values of humans depend on divine grace and faith (e.g., early treatment of American 
indigenous peoples as non-humans because they had not yet been “saved”). However, the theory of 
evolution challenges the use of different standards for (i.e., the incommensurability of) humans and 
non-humans, unless “God is love” (John 4:16) and creation is not a one-time event, but rather a 
continuous giving of life by the Holy Spirit. Finally, seeing Earth’s other creatures and goods as 
“resources”, as in the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), supports the absence of any 
sustainability concept, and suggests that subduing of the Earth should aim at meeting human needs 
(i.e., Wi ≥ w for each individual i). 
Note that in the Life of St. Francis by St. Bonaventure, St. Francis is quoted as saying: “Lord, 
I thank thee for the sufferings thou art sending me. Send me more, if it be thy good pleasure. My 
pleasure is that you afflict me and spare me not, for the fulfilment of thy holy will is the greatest 
consolation of my life states”: in other words, humans achieve happiness by meeting God’s will 
(i.e., α ≈ 0), as represented by creation and natural events such as infirmitate et tribulationes (i.e., 
disease and other trials of the flesh). Only humans have liberties. He refers to water, sun, wind, and 
land as brothers and sisters, so that creation has the same dignity as humans (i.e., m > 1). This 
approach seems to be similar to Hinduism. However, non-human beings are not mentioned, which 
is consistent with the incommensurability of humans and animals: indeed, speeches to animals (e.g., 
birds, wolves) by St. Francis instead represent speeches to social categories of humans (e.g., poor 
people, pagans). St. Francis states that the use of nature should be only enough to achieve a 
subsistence life s (i.e., E ≤ s). Mathematically: 
θ/𝐸𝑖 𝑠. 𝑡.  𝐸𝑖 ≤ 𝑠 and 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤 
Thus, sustainability is achieved if s ≤ θ. 
In the Eastern Orthodox religion, St. Gregory of Nyssa states that “The conclusive harmony in 
the world has not yet been revealed (On the Creation of Man). St. John Chrysostom states that 
“Creation is beautiful and harmonious, and God has made it all just for your sake. He has made it 
beautiful, grand, varied, and rich” (On Providence); “For our sake the Earth was subjected to 
corruption” (On Isaiah). St. Symeon of Thessalonika states that “The Divine Liturgy [celebrating 
the perception and the very presence of heaven on Earth] constitutes the holy of holies” (On the 
Holy Liturgy). St. Gregory of Nyssa states that “Christ emptied himself, so that nature might receive 
as much of him as it could hold” (On the Psalms). In summary, one should live in faith and love 
(vita contemplativa, the contemplative life) by withdrawing or escaping from the created world; 
God is omnipotent and independent, while the world is limited, dependent, and incomplete without 
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God, although the Holy Spirit lets us combine the divine unity, divine transcendence, and God into 
creation (Chryssavgis, 2006). Mathematically: 
𝑊𝑖 = (λ 𝐸𝑖)
α (μ/𝐸𝑖)
1−α and 𝐸𝑖 ≤ 𝑒 and  𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤 
With a large μ and a small α. Thus, sustainability is achieved if e ≤ θ. 
For Protestantism, Martin Luther depicts God as being “with all creatures, flowing, and 
pouring into them, filling all things” (Weimar Ausbage); “When I truly grasp the significance of the 
incarnation of the Son of God in this world, all creatures will appear a hundred times more beautiful 
to me than before (Weimar Ausbage). Calvin expresses similar feelings in the Institutes. Calvin 
states that “The end for which all things were created was that none of the conveniences and 
necessities of life might be wanting to men” (Commentaries on the First Book of Moses called 
Genesis); Martin Luther expresses similar sentiments in Lectures on Genesis. In summary, the focus 
is on nature as a manifestation of God, anthropocentrism, an active life (vita activa) rather than a 
contemplative life (vita contemplativa), and beauty in nature (Cowdin, 2008; Santmire and Cobb, 
2006; Simmons, 2009). Mathematically: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊C 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤 with ε > 0 
Note that social justice in Protestantism (e.g., the “two Kingdoms” doctrine) supports a 
positive ε, although the ethics of ecological justice are too recent to fix ε = 1: this would not ensure 
sustainability anyway. 
In summary, Christianity (Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox, or Protestantism) is not enough to 
achieve sustainability. Indeed, Christian principles of “equal dignity of humans” (i.e., all siblings as 
children of the same God) and “love of neighbour” (i.e., love each other as God loved you) do not 
imply sustainability. 
2.5. Islam 
In the Qur’an, one can read: “I am setting on the Earth a vice-regent” (2:31). “It is He who 
has made you his vice-successors of others on Earth” (6:165), and “Allah loves not mischief” 
(2:205); thus, “Do not mischief on the Earth after it has been set in order” (7:86). Furthermore, “O 
Children of Adam! Look to your adornment at every place of worship, and eat and drink, but be not 
wasteful. Lo! He loves not the wasteful” (7:31). “There is no creature that moves in the Earth but it 
is for Allah to provide it with sustenance” (11:6). 
In summary, humans act as trustees for future generations and must show moderation in the 
utilisation of nature and must use the environment to the smallest possible extent to meet our needs 
(Foltz, 2006; Muhammadi and Haftador, 2014; Saniotis, 2012). Note that although similar 
reasoning can be found in the Sunna, such as “Live in this world as if you will live in it forever, and 
live for the next world as if you will die tomorrow” (Musnad, 5:440), I have referred to the Qur’an 
as an indisputable source because the deeds and words of the Prophet Muhammad (i.e., the 
examples of his actions in the Sunna) are accepted by Sunnis (around 80% of all Muslims), but not 
(totally) accepted by Shi’ites, who have compiled their own collection. Mathematically (where ISL 
represents the parameter value for Islam): 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑖 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤ISL and 𝐸𝑖 ≥ 𝑒ISL and 𝐸𝑖 ≤ θ with ζ = 0 and ε = 0 
Thus, solutions can be represented as follows: 
αISL ≤
ln[𝑤ISL] − ln[μ θ⁄ ]
ln[θ λISL] − ln[μ θ⁄ ]
 , αISL ≥ 0 , αISL ≤ 1, μ ≥ 0 
Note that the role of women in historical Muslim societies justifies ε = 0. Moreover, the 
prohibition against charging interest on a loan in the Qur’an (4:161, 30:39, 2:275-278; 3:130) 
would favour the preservation of renewable resources to a level near the maximum sustainable 
yields. Finally, m = 1 can be justified as follows. Although the Qur’an states that “there is not an 
animal in the Earth, nor a flying creature on two wings, but they are peoples like unto you” (6:38), 
suggesting that animals seem to have an existence and a purpose independent of their usefulness to 
humans, the Qur’an also states that cattle and beasts of burden were created to serve humans 
(26:133 and 36:72). Similarly, in the Sunna, Muhammad is believed to have said that: “If you kill, 
kill well, and if you slaughter, slaughter well. Let each of you sharpen his blade and let him spare 
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suffering to the animal he slaughters” and “Some trees are as blessed as the Muslim himself, 
especially the palm”, so Muslims must show compassion towards non-humans and respect for 
plants. However, human species alone can be rewarded with eternal life, and the aims of humans 
and non-humans are different. In other words, all of creation submits to the natural laws of Allah, 
although plants and animals are considered to have a lower dignity than humans. 
2.6. Summary of religious environmental ethics 
Table 1 summarises the objectives and constraints of the religions I have chosen for analysis, 
and the resulting environmental ethics. Note that Daoism, with its principle of non-action and its 
depiction of nature as flows through bodies, thereby implying that human health contributes to 
environmental equilibrium, resembles a dynamic version of Jainism, with its emphasis on 
asceticism. Moreover, all religions are depicted as concerned only with the current population size 
(i.e., θ is normalised with respect to the current generation), apart from Judaism, which also 
considers population dynamics (i.e., n ≠ 1). Finally, Islam and Catholicism are depicted as 
unconcerned about social inequalities (i.e., ε = 0), although the recent emphasis on labour rights for 
Catholics and on women’s rights for Muslims must be noted. 
Table 1. Objectives, constraints, and parameters that characterise the main religious environmental ethics.  
Religion Objectives Constraints Parameters 
Hinduism 𝑊𝑖 = (λHIN 𝐸𝑖)
α (𝜇/𝐸𝑖)
1−α 𝐸𝑖 ≤  θ 𝑚⁄ , 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤HIN Large μ 
Jainism 𝑊𝑖 = (λ 𝐸𝑖)
α (μ/𝐸𝑖)
1−α 𝐸𝑖 ≤  𝑠  
Buddhism 𝑊𝑖 = (λBUD 𝐸𝑖)
α (μ/𝐸𝑖)
1−α 𝐸𝑖 ≤  θ 𝑚⁄ , 𝐸𝑖 ≤ 𝑒BUD, 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤BUD  
Confucianism 𝑊𝑖 = (λ 𝐸𝑖)
α (μ/𝐸𝑖)
1−α ∑𝑟𝑖𝐸𝑖 ≤ θ, 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤  
Daoism 𝑊𝑖 = (λ 𝐸𝑖)
α (μ/𝐸𝑖)
1−𝛼  𝐸𝑖 ≤  𝑠  
Judaism 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤JUD, 𝐸𝑖 ≤ θ 𝑛 ≠ 1, 𝜁 = 1, 𝜀 = 0 
Christian Catholicism 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊C 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤 𝜀 = 0 
Christian Eastern 
Orthodoxy 
𝑊𝑖 = (λ 𝐸𝑖)
α (μ/𝐸𝑖)
1−α 𝐸𝑖 ≤ 𝑒, 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤 Large μ 
Christian Protestantism 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊C 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤 𝜀 > 0 
Islam 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑖 
𝑊𝑖 = (λISL 𝐸𝑖)
α (μ 𝐸𝑖⁄ )
1−α ≥ 𝑤ISL 
𝐸𝑖 ≥ 𝑒ISL, 𝑒ISL ≤ θ 
𝜁 = 0, 𝜀 = 0 
Notation: α = relative importance attached to consumption; Ei = the use of the environment by individual i; e = needs in 
terms of the use of the environment for Buddhism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam; ε = aversion to intra-generation 
inequalities, λ = the level of environmental technology (gross domestic product, GDP, per unit of ecological footprint, 
EF); m = number of human and non-human beings with the same dignity as human beings divided by the number of 
human beings (i.e., m ≥ 1); θ = the sustainable use of the environment based on EF; μ = the importance attached to the 
environment within a community; n = the number of people in the future divided by the number in the current 
generation (i.e., n > 1 if population increases); s = use of the environment to provide the bare necessities of life for 
Jainism and Daoism; W = welfare of current (WC) and future (WF) generations; w = needs in terms of welfare for all 
religions apart from Jainism and Daoism; WC = welfare of current generation; Wi = welfare of a representative 
individual i in the current generation; ri = relative weight attached to individual i in a Confucian community; ζ = 
aversion to inter-generation inequality. 
 
Three main remarks are noteworthy here. First, there is an inconsistency shared by all 
religions analysed in this paper: they place a high value on each individual for both human and 
animal lives, whereas for animal lives, sustainability focuses only the species as a whole. Indeed, in 
Judaism, “O Lord, all eyes hope in you, and you provide their food in due time. You open your 
hand, and you fill every kind of animal with a blessing” (Psalms 144:15-16, and similarly, in 
Psalms 103:2728); in Christianity, “Father feedeth them” (Matthew 6:26); in Islam, “There is no 
creature that moves in the Earth but it is for Allah to provide it with sustenance” (11:6); and in 
Hinduism, “Mother Earth, like a Cosmic Cow, gives us the thousandfold prosperity without 
hesitation without being outraged by our destructive actions” (Atharva Veda, Mantras 45 and 59). 
Second, although the bare environmental necessities (i.e., minimum environmental resources 
required for survival), as supported by some religions (i.e., Daoism, Jainism), can be used to 
achieve sustainability, the concepts of the environment’s needs per se that are shared by many 
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religions (i.e., Buddhism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam) cannot be assumed to represent a consistent 
standard of comparison (i.e., a reliable precept), since the concept of needs changes in time and 
space. 
Third, belief in the beauty of nature, in sacred nature, or in the harmony of nature, although 
supported by different religions in different ways, is insufficient to achieve sustainability, even if 
this belief is combined with punishment for violating rules (e.g., Eastern Orthodoxy, Buddhism) or 
is combined with cooperation in an extended community (e.g., Hinduism), since they are not 
objective behavioural rules. In particular, sacred nature is assumed to be a subjective feeling (i.e., 
here depicted by μ), similar to a subjective preference for goods (i.e., here, depicted by α) rather 
than to a prescribed action. Indeed, if nature is believed to be created by God or provided as a gift 
from God, nature has an intrinsic value and humans are then perceived to be members of a natural 
community. However, unless the use of the environment is at a subsistence level (i.e., E = s, and 
humans live like many animals), with the associated huge opportunity costs for the current 
generation, belief in sacred nature is not a beneficial rule of action for achieving sustainability 
unless it is coupled with individual or social (current or future) punishments by deities; this 
approach is more and more unlikely to be implemented nowadays. Actually, if a river is sacred even 
if it is polluted (e.g., the Ganges River in Hinduism), one can neglect the social health problems that 
arise from taking a bath; similarly, if the world is considered to be an impermanent phenomenon, 
created to serve the deity’s purpose (e.g., Islam), one can avoid conservation of nature because that 
deity’s purpose will be finally fulfilled (Grim and Tucker, 2014). 
3. The empirical literature 
Since sustainability is linked to individual and social environmental behaviours, in this 
section I will refer to the empirical psychological and anthropological literatures to find support for 
the reliability of the relationship between religions and pro-environmental behaviours. Indeed, 
psychology aims to identify non-inborn individual motivations based on experiences and objectives 
(together with incentives) that lead towards pro-environmental behaviour and attitudes of 
individuals (e.g., an inborn individual behaviour is to increase consumption), whereas anthropology 
aims at identifying social values based on traditions and perceptions (together with education) that 
lead towards non-innate pro-environmental behaviour and attitudes of groups (e.g., an innate social 
behaviour is to increase the population). In other words, psychology assumes a universalist process 
of cognition (i.e., not strongly affected by cultural differences), and focuses on alternative contents 
of cognition to identify relationships such as “from religious experiences to pro-environmental 
behaviour of individuals”, whereas anthropology assumes no distinction between the process and 
content of cognition by identifying regularities such as “from differences in religious culture to 
differences in pro-environmental behaviour of groups”. 
There is a recent but growing empirical psychology literature that analyses the relationship 
between specific religious features and pro-environmental behaviours. This literature includes 
Zaleha (2013), on nature veneration predicting pro-environmental behaviour in the United States; 
Garfield et al. (2014), on spiritual oneness predicting donations to environmental groups in the 
United States; Clements et al. (2014), on the pro-environmental attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours of 
Christians in the United States; Gifford and Nilsson (2014), on a review of the influences on pro-
environmental concerns and behaviour of religions, together with some pre-requisites such as 
knowledge, childhood experiences, activity choices, personality, and perceived behavioural control; 
Peifer et al. (2016), on the impacts of attendance at religious ceremonies and identity in the United 
States versus belief in an involved God and biblical literalism on environmental consumption; and 
Arli and Tjiptono (2017), on the purchase of green products by Muslim and Christian consumers in 
Indonesia. 
However, most research on the relationships between religion and pro-environmental 
behaviour has been conducted from the perspective of anthropology. In particular, some of the 
empirical anthropology literature is sceptical about the real role of religions (i.e., beliefs, 
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perceptions, and practices related to extraordinary, non-material divine beings or forces) in shaping 
environmental perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours. Indeed, although Judaism, and especially the 
Reformed and Conservative branches, has turned out to be more environmentally concerned than 
Christians, the impacts of these attitudes differ according to the alternative measures applied to 
religion (e.g., synagogue or church attendance, importance of religion in daily life) and to pro-
environmental behaviours such as a willingness to support higher environmental spending by the 
government, a willingness to invest personal funds to protect nature, and self-reported 
environmental concern (Taylor et al., 2016). 
Some anecdotal evidence from the anthropology literature stresses that religions could have a 
negative impact on pro-environmental behaviour. Indeed, anti-environmental behaviour is often 
based on fatalistic perspectives (Taylor, 2015). For example, given God’s sovereignty, it is arrogant 
to think that human beings can significantly damage nature; from that perspective, environmental 
circumstances and changes can then be attributed to divine favour or disfavour due to sin. 
Consequently, prescribed actions to deal with environmental problems are often ineffective (e.g., 
prayer, by Christian and Muslim groups; do nothing, since Jesus is coming soon, by Evangelical 
groups; do nothing, by Hindu groups, since a certain mountain, forest, or river is perceived to be 
sacred) and thus, not something humans should attempt to change (Sponsel, 2016). 
Note that, by emphasising the crucial impacts of overpopulation (e.g., Crist, 2016) and 
overconsumption (e.g., Twomey and Washington, 2016), some of the speculative anthropology 
literature is sceptical about the success of religious institutions in promoting the greening of 
religions by fostering pro-environmental behaviour (Taylor, 2016): First, the number of people who 
are unaffiliated with any religion is increasing. Second, religions disagree on many points, some of 
which should be considered to achieve global sustainability (e.g., greed and destructiveness are 
condemned; restraint and protection are commended; human beings are obliged to live in harmony 
with the natural world); other points would be useless to achieve global sustainability (e.g., 
assuming that the natural world has value can be seen as idolatrous; justice, compassion, and 
reciprocity apply both to human and to non-human beings; there is a continuity of being between 
human and non-human living beings that can be seen as a rejection of the religious distinction 
between humans and everything else). Third, religions are institutions that take a long time to 
change. 
4. Data and normalisations 
In this section, I provide empirical values for the parameters introduced in section 2 that 
characterise each religion at a national level. In particular, I distinguish all countries where a given 
religion accounted for more than 50% of the total population in 2010 based on the CIA World 
FactBook (www.cia.gov). I have excluded Christianity from this analysis, since the analysis in 
Section 2.4 suggests that it can never achieve sustainability unless it follows the philosophy of St. 
Francis, in which use of the environment should be at a subsistence level. This approach identified 
52 Muslim countries (i.e., Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, 
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Sudan, Tajikistan, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen), 9 Hindu or Buddhist 
countries (i.e., Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Laos, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand), and 1 
Jewish country (i.e., Israel). 
From the World Bank’s world development indicators (http://data.worldbank.org), I obtained 
the per capita GDP (purchasing power parity basis, PPP) and population in 2012. I estimated the per 
capita use of the environment for representative individuals in these countries (E0) using data from 
the Global Footprint Network (http://www.footprintnetwork.org), where  the current ecological 
footprint (i.e., the biologically productive area needed to provide everything an individual uses) is 
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measured at a national level. The sustainability of a representative individual of the world at the 
current population level requires θ = 1.7 ha. I then calculated the weighted averages in population 
terms of GDP PPP (in USD) and EF (in ha) that characterise a representative individual in Muslim 
countries (i.e., USD7903 and 1.65 ha), in Hindu or Buddhist countries (i.e., USD9380 and 2.45 ha), 
and in the one Jewish country (i.e., USD30 879 and 6.20 ha) for which data was available (i.e., in 
40, 8 and 1 countries, respectively. 
I assumed that consumption can be approximated by income, even though postponed 
consumption (as a result of saving or investment) affects the welfare of future generations, and 
assumed that consumption of imported goods increases welfare where they are consumed, although 
their production might increase use of the environment and so reduce welfare where they are 
produced and then exported. Based on this assumption, I calculated the current level of λ (λ0, which 
represents the current use of the environment for each unit of consumption): 4.98, 4.78, and 3.83 ha 
for Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu or Buddhist countries, respectively. 
The relative frequencies of α in a population as well as the average current value attached to 
the bonding environmental capital (μ) are unknown. However, without significant 
misrepresentation, I assumed that the current welfare of the representative individual (w0) depends 
on people attaching all value to consumption (i.e., α = 1). Thus, the current welfare level is given by 
w0 = λ0 E0. This let me calculate the following approximate welfare levels of w0: 7.903, 9.380, and 
30.879 for Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist, and Jewish countries, respectively. Moreover, I assumed 
that people who attach no value to consumption (i.e. α = 0) achieve the current welfare level w0: 
thus, w0 = μ0/E0 or μ0 = w0 E0. This let me calculate the current levels of μ0: 21.51, 56.30, and 
1186.99 for Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist, and Jewish countries, respectively. Finally, I multiplied the 
current public and direct expenditures in environmental conservation as a percentage of GDP by 4 
to estimate both public and private expenditures as well as both direct and indirect expenditures. 
This assumes that these four categories of expenditure have approximately equal values, on 
average. In future research, it would be worthwhile repeating this calculation with actual values for 
each category if comparable data becomes available for each country. I did this by estimating the 
complementary to 1 of the current α (i.e., I calculated 1 – α0). In particular, based on the small 
amount of available data (unstats.un.org) (i.e., 1.5% of GDP in China, versus 1.2% in Japan, 0.5% 
in Israel, and 0.4% in Turkey), I estimated the proportions of GDP as 2%, 4%, and 2% for Muslim, 
Hindu or Buddhist, and Jewish countries, respectively. 
Note that these percentages, combined with per capita GDP, evoke an environmental Kuznets 
curve (i.e., a curve shaped like an inverted U), such that environmental expenditures are small in 
pre-industrial economies (due to the smaller environmental problems), large in industrial economies 
(due to the larger environmental problems), and small in post-industrial economies (due to the 
larger per capita incomes and the higher import of goods and services produced in other countries, 
thereby shifting environmental impacts to the exporter countries). 
This let me estimate the current welfare level consistent with all parameter values: 7.903, 
9.380, and 30.879 for Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist, and Jewish countries, respectively. Note that the 
similar welfare (u0) values I obtained from each of the analyses described in this paragraph suggests 
that the normalizations I applied to μ0 had little effect on the results of the analysis (i.e., the impacts 
of the applied normalisations of μ0 are insignificant). 
I applied similar reasoning to a globally representative individual. In particular, I used the 
weighted average values for a globally representative individual (Zagonari, 2018) for GDP PPP 
(i.e., USD13 348) and EF (i.e., 2.79 ha) to obtain values of λ0 = 4.78 and μ0 = 37.24, and then 
obtained the value of u0 = 13.348 based on average current expenditures in conservation of the 
environment as a proportion of GDP (i.e., 3%). 
5. Empirical results 
In this section, I apply the parameter values estimated in section 4 to the solutions presented 
in section 2. In particular, I will check for the sustainability conditions presented in section 2 in 
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contexts identified by the parameter values estimated in section 4. Appendix I highlights how the 
solutions related to each religion (e.g., whether α increases or decreases with increasing μ) depend 
on the current values of λ0 and w0. 
5.1. Sustainability at current national levels of GDP and EF in countries 
where the religion is a majority 
Figure 1 compares the areas of the solution space where sustainability can be feasibly 
achieved by Hinduism or Buddhism, by Judaism, and by Islam, if the respective religious 
environmental ethics defined in section 2 are applied in countries where these religions are followed 
by at least 50% of the population. 
Figure 1. Comparison of the feasibility of religious environmental ethics for achieving sustainability, with the 
future population set at n = 1.1 and the dignity of non-human beings set at m = 10. For Judaism (small light blue 
area at the bottom right side of the figure), μ ≥ 47.7; for Islam (yellow and light yellow), μ ≤ 13.3; and for 
Hinduism or Buddhism (light yellow, white area under the increasing curve, and light blue), μ ≥ 1.6. 
 
 
The main insights can be summarised as follows: 
 Hinduism and Buddhism (40.1% of the global population) are not constrained by μ, although 
α must be small: in other words, high levels of consumerism are not allowed when 
sustainability is achieved. 
 Judaism is unlikely to favour sustainability in Israel, since α must be too small (in contrast 
with the current lifestyle and with personal wealth seen as a premium from God) and μ must 
be too large (in contrast with evolutionary theory and either pantheism or nature worship). 
However, Judaism represents only 0.2% of the global population. 
 Islam (22.8% of the global population) can be characterised by a large α and a small μ, 
provided that w is sufficiently small (i.e., parsimony): in other words, consumerism is 
allowed, if it is coupled with a small use of the environment. 
Note that α increases with increasing μ for Hinduism or Buddhism and for Judaism, whereas 
it decreases for Islam. 
In terms of feasibility (i.e., solutions for pairs of α and μ, with μ in the range [min μ, 50]), 
Hinduism or Buddhism > Islam > Judaism; that is, the feasible areas of the solution space amount to 
23.00, 11.91, and 0.04, respectively, where these figures should be multiplied by 2 (= 100 / 50, with 
50 = 50 × 1 being the size of the whole feasible area) to obtain the percentage of the total graph area 
that is feasible. Appendix II confirms this ranking in terms of both the significance and the size of 
the parameters attached to religious environmental ethics by performing an econometric analysis. 
Note that defining feasible areas calculated with μ in [min μ, 100] would increase the feasibility of 
Hinduism or Buddhism and of Judaism (i.e., to 52.45 and 12.74, respectively), although such a 
large involvement in sacred nature is unrealistic for Judaism. 
Appendix III provides a sensitivity analysis to illustrate the effects of modifying various 
parameter values. Figure A1 provides the solution space if n is set at 0.9 and m is set at 5. Note that 
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the feasible area disappears for Judaism, since it produces infeasible values of µ. Indeed, a reduced 
future population combined with inter-generational equity implies that the current generation must 
rely on belonging to an environmental community to a larger extent (i.e., μ > 50). 
In terms of consistency (i.e., whether a feasible sustainability solution could be favoured by 
the religious characteristics described in Section 2), Hinduism or Buddhism > Islam > Judaism. 
Indeed, stressing the intrinsic value of nature for Hindus or Buddhists (i.e., m > 1) seems to be 
easier than ensuring moderation in the use of the environment by Muslims (i.e., small w), which in 
turn seems to be easier than reducing the future population for a Jewish country (i.e., n < 1). 
Note that the use of greener technology would allow a larger amount of consumerism for 
Hinduism or Buddhism, but a smaller amount of consumerism for Islam, by decreasing the 
feasibility for Muslim countries and increasing it for Hinduism or Buddhism (i.e., feasible areas at a 
10% larger λ would be 10.19 and 23.38, respectively). Indeed, solutions for Islam are constrained 
by e (i.e., the minimum use of the environment to achieve the current welfare level), whereas 
solutions for Hinduism or Buddhism  are constrained by θ (i.e., any welfare level consistent with a 
sustainable use of the environment). The reasoning for Hinduism or Buddhism also applies to 
Judaism, since welfare is not constrained, whereas welfare is maximised in Judaism. Moreover, 
allowing a larger α in Muslim countries could favour economic growth by supporting domestic 
demand. Finally, the calculated feasibility rankings of the religions differ from the observed order 
of countries where the religion is a majority in terms of their current use of the environment (i.e., 
religions can conceivably play a role in solving environmental issues in different countries). 
5.2. Sustainability at average world levels of GDP and EF 
Figure 2 compares the areas of the solution space where sustainability can be feasibly 
achieved by Hinduism or Buddhism, by Judaism, and by Islam if the respective religious 
environmental ethics are applied to an average globally representative country (e.g., if a more equal 
income distribution is achieved in the future). 
Figure 2. Comparison of the effectiveness of achieving sustainability based on religious environmental ethics, 
with the future population set at n = 1.1 and with the dignity of non-human beings set at m = 10. For Judaism 
(blue and light blue, green, and light green areas), μ ≥ 20.6; for Islam (green and light green areas), μ ≥ 22.7; and 
for Hinduism or Buddhism (white area under the first increasing curve from the left, light blue and light green), 
μ ≥ 2.3. 
 
 
Since the alternative environmental ethics characterising the analysed religions are applied to 
the same unsustainable but possible world scenario, the feasibility ranking can be interpreted as an 
effectiveness ranking (i.e., the potential of each religion to solve the same environmental problem). 
In terms of effectiveness (i.e., efficiency in achieving sustainability in an average world 
scenario), Hinduism or Buddhism > Judaism > Islam (i.e., with feasible areas of 20.53, 15.12, and 
11.95, respectively). Note that Judaism, with the largest α, turns out to be the religion most suited to 
the hyper-inflated Western lifestyle, which is based on high consumption of energy and goods 
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(Tucker, 2015), although α turns out to be significantly smaller than 1 (i.e., α ≤ 0.69), and it must be 
coupled with a sufficiently large μ. 
Figure A2 in Appendix III provides the solution spaces if n is set at 0.9 and m is set at 5. Note 
that Judaism is less effective than Islam if the population decreases. Indeed, the future generation 
could rely on a larger per capita use of the environment and will achieve a smaller total welfare, 
which requires a smaller consumerism by the current generation, due to inter-generational equity. 
The main insights can be summarised as follows: 
 Hinduism and Buddhism are slightly constrained by μ (i.e., μ ≥ 4) if m is sufficiently large 
(i.e., m ≥ 5), although they do not allow the same degree of consumerism as Judaism and 
Islam (i.e., they have a smaller α), 
 Judaism allows the largest consumerism (i.e., the largest α) if the involvement in a local or 
global environmental community is large enough (i.e., μ ≥ 26). 
 Islam allows a smaller degree of consumerism than Judaism (i.e., a smaller α for each μ), and 
it requires a larger μ than Hinduism or Buddhism and Judaism. 
Note that for Islam, applying the solutions to a representative country implies α increasing 
with increasing μ. 
5.3. Sustainability at current national levels of GDP and EF for countries 
in which each religion is a minority 
Figures 3 to 5 compare the areas of the solution space in which sustainability can be feasibly 
achieved by Hinduism or Buddhism, by Judaism, and by Islam if these religious environmental 
ethics are applied to countries where they represent minority religions (i.e., where these religions 
are followed by less than 50% of the population). Since the parameter values based on the 
alternative environmental ethics that characterise the analysed religions were applied to the same 
currently unsustainable scenarios in countries where the religion is a minority, the effectiveness 
ranking can be interpreted as a replicability ranking (i.e., as the potential of each religion to solve 
the same environmental problem in countries where other religions prevail). 
To broaden the scope of the insights into current and future sustainability, let us assume that 
Muslim countries represent pre-industrial economies, that Hindu or Buddhist countries depict 
industrial economies, and that Israel represents a post-industrial economy. Patently, this is a 
simplification, and some exceptions can be easily proposed. For example, Turkey is a Muslim 
country, but it is an industrial economy, whereas Japan is a Buddhist country, but it is a post-
industrial economy. However, the calculation of weighted averages in population terms of GDP and 
EF for countries where the agriculture sector accounts for more than 16% of GDP (pre-industrial 
societies), where the industry sector accounts for more than 32% of GP (industrial societies), and 
where the service sector accounts for more than 64% of GDP (post-industrial societies) based on 
global data (www.worldbank.org) can be used to select pre-industrial, industrial, and post-industrial 
economies, respectively. So doing produces a ranking of GDP similar to the ranking obtained by 
selecting majority Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist, and Jewish countries, respectively. Indeed, 
population-weighted GDP for post-industrial economies = 32 488 US$ > GDP for industrial 
economies = 10 324 US$ > GDP for pre-industrial economies = 3358 US$. These values are similar 
to the population-weighted GDP for Israel = 30 879 US$ > GDP for Hindu or Buddhist countries = 
9380 US$ > GDP for Muslim countries = 7903 US$, and the values are strongly and significantly 
correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.99, p < 0.05). Similarly, the ranking of EF for pre-industrial, industrial, 
and post-industrial economies is similar to the ranking of EF for majority Muslim, Hindu or 
Buddhist, and Jewish countries, respectively. Indeed, population-weighted EF for post-industrial 
economies = 5.21 > EF for industrial economies = 2.52 > EF for pre-industrial economies = 1.16. 
These values are similar to the population-weighted EF for Israel = 6.20 > EF for Hindu or 
Buddhist countries = 2.45 > EF for Muslim countries = 1.65, and the values are strongly and 
significantly correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.99, p < 0.05). 
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Figure 3. Comparison of the replicability of religious environmental ethics for achieving sustainability in pre-
industrial economies, with n = 1.1 and m = 10. For Judaism (green and light green areas), μ ≤ 12.1; for Islam 
(yellow and light yellow, green and light green areas), μ ≤ 13.3; and for Hinduism or Buddhism (light green, light 
yellow, white area under the increasing curve), μ ≥ 1.3. 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of the replicability of religious environmental ethics for achieving sustainability in 
industrial economies, with n = 1.1 and m = 10. For Judaism (blue and light blue, green and light green areas), μ ≥ 
14.5; for Islam (green and light green areas), μ ≥ 15.9; and for Hinduism or Buddhism (white area under the 
increasing curve, light blue and light green), μ ≥ 1.6. 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of the replicability of religious environmental ethics for achieving sustainability in post-
industrial economies, with n = 1.1 and m = 10. For Judaism (small light blue area at the bottom right side of 
figure), μ ≥ 47.7; for Islam, μ ≥ 52.5 (i.e., there are no feasible μ); and for Hinduism or Buddhism (white area 
under the increasing curve, and light blue), μ ≥ 5.2. 
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Note that the thresholds I chose for the type of economy (i.e., 16, 32, and 64% of GDP) 
produced some countries in which the development level could not be clearly distinguished because 
none of the thresholds were exceeded (i.e., in 11 out of 135 cases) or in which two development 
levels were possible because two thresholds were exceeded (i.e., in 4 out of 133 cases). In these 15 
cases, the country was allocated to a development level category based on the threshold closest to 
its actual percentage of the economy from below and the threshold farthest from this percentage 
from above. For example, the Ukraine was 7, 4, and 1 percentage points below the thresholds for 
pre-industrial, industrial, and post-industrial countries; as a result, I allocated the Ukraine to the 
post-industrial development level. In contrast, Uzbekistan had values 3 and 1 percentage points 
above and 16 points below the respective thresholds, so I allocated it to the pre-industrial 
development level. 
These identifications let me discuss the potential use of the principles that characterise a given 
religion in countries that are currently at the same and different levels of industrial development in 
countries where the religions are currently a majority (e.g., to suggest that the principles of Judaism 
apply to post-industrial, industrial, or pre-industrial countries, instead of applying Judaism to Israel, 
Hindu or Buddhist, or Muslim countries). 
Obviously, the results based on data that characterises different religions will be 
quantitatively different from results based on data that characterises different development classes. 
However, the obtained insights are qualitatively similar. These results are presented in Figures A6 
to A8 of Appendix III. 
The main insights can be summarised as follows, without accounting for the impacts on 
sustainability of the current and future global level of imports and exports: 
 Hinduism and Buddhism are feasible in pre-industrial, industrial, and post-industrial 
countries, although they are less effective in post-industrial countries. 
 Judaism can be applied to pre-industrial countries, although it is less effective than Islam, 
whereas it is the most effective set of principles for industrial countries. 
 Islam is not feasible in post-industrial countries, and it is less effective than Judaism in 
industrial countries. 
Note that α decreases with increasing μ for Judaism if this set of religious ethics is applied to 
pre-industrial economies. 
In terms of replicability (i.e., effectiveness in achieving sustainability in countries where the 
religion is a minority): Hinduism or Buddhism > Judaism > Islam. Indeed, Hinduism or Buddhism 
> Islam > Judaism in pre-industrial economies (i.e., with feasible areas of 25.81, 11.91, 9.23, 
respectively); Judaism ≈ Hinduism or Buddhism > Islam in industrial economies (i.e., with feasible 
areas of 24.24, 23.00, 20.49, respectively); and Hinduism  or Buddhism > Judaism, and Islam is 
infeasible, in post-industrial economies (i.e., with feasible areas of 12.83 and 0.04, respectively). 
Note that if pre-industrial countries are sustainable by following Islamic principles, provided 
that wISL and eISL are small, they can also be sustainable according to the same principles if they 
become industrial economies, provided that μ increases and α decreases. In other words, Islamic 
principles are ineffective for industrial economies, but they are still feasible. Similarly, if industrial 
countries are sustainable by following Hindu or Buddhist principles, provided that α is small, they 
can also be sustainable according to the same principles if they become post-industrial economies, 
provided that μ increases. In other words, Hindu or Buddhist principles are ineffective, but they are 
still feasible. 
Figures A3 to A5 in Appendix III provide solution spaces if n is set at 0.9 and m is set at 5. 
Note that if the population decreases, Judaism becomes the most effective set of religious ethics for 
pre-industrial economies. 
6. Discussion 
The overall insights obtained from the analytical model developed in Section 2 and applied to 
the data presented in Section 4 can be summarised as follows: In terms of feasibility, the principles 
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of equilibrium that underlie Hinduism and Buddhism are the most reliable ways to achieve 
sustainability, although this implies a smaller degree of consumerism. The principles of parsimony 
and trusteeship that underlie Islam are effective at the lowest stages of development (i.e., pre-
industrial economies), which are currently the conditions prevailing in many Muslim countries, but 
they are the least effective way to achieve sustainability at higher stages of development. Indeed, 
minimising the use of the environment subject to a maximum welfare level w is less constrained if 
w is small. The principles of stewardship that underlie Judaism are inadequate for the current 
unsustainable levels of consumption in Israel (i.e., a post-industrial economy), although they are the 
most effective way to achieve sustainability at an average stage of development. That is, 
maximising welfare subject to sustainability constraints is more effective than minimizing use of 
the environment subject to welfare constraints, as suggested by the Islamic precepts, and is more 
effective than adapting welfare to sustainability conditions, as suggested by the Hindu and Buddhist 
principles. 
In terms of consistency with its religious principles, Israel could have problems in promoting 
the sanctity of nature (i.e., a larger μ is inconsistent with the Old Testament), although they could 
rely on a reduced population (i.e., a smaller n). Moreover, Hindu and Buddhist countries have no 
problem emphasising the dignity of non-human beings (i.e., a large m), although they could have 
problems in maintaining a small relative value attached to consumption (i.e., a small α). Finally, 
Muslim countries could have problems promoting satisfaction with a low consumption of the 
environment (i.e., a small w is consistent with the Qur’an), although they could rely on 
technological improvements to accomplish this (i.e., a larger λ). 
Note that adopting greener technology (i.e., a larger λ) might be detrimental for pre-industrial 
economies that adopt Islam (i.e., α decreasing with increasing μ), since it implies a smaller domestic 
demand (i.e., a larger λ implies a smaller α at equilibrium), whereas it would be beneficial for 
industrial and post-industrial economies that adopt Judaism (i.e., α increases with increasing μ), as 
it would allow higher domestic demand (i.e., a larger λ implies a larger equilibrium α). Indeed, if 
Islam is adopted, an increase in consumption X due to an improvement in technology λ, because of 
fixed needs in terms of welfare w, must be compensated for by a reduction in the relative 
importance attached to consumption α. In contrast, if Judaism is adopted, an increase in 
consumption X due to an improvement in technology λ must not be compensated for by a reduction 
in the relative importance attached to consumption α, since what is fixed is the use of the 
environment at its sustainability level θ. The reasoning for Judaism also applies to Hinduism and 
Buddhism, since welfare is not constrained, whereas welfare is maximised in Judaism. 
The main weaknesses of the approach adopted in the present study are that: 
 It does not account for differences in religions at a national level (e.g., Chinese versus 
Japanese Confucianism) or at the level of a given overall faith (e.g., Evangelists versus 
Baptists within Christianity) (Pedersen, 2015). However, because my focus was on the main 
shared precepts of a given religion, this should not be a major problem. 
 I parametrised the model for countries where a majority of the people believe in a given 
religion, although different environmental practices are observed in countries characterised by 
the same religion, and many people with a given religion live in countries where they are not 
the religious majority (Saniotis, 2012). However, because my analysis stresses a few of the 
main precepts of each religion, it achieves overall insights that can be interpreted as 
dependent on individual income levels (e.g., Islam provides the easiest rules to achieve 
sustainability at a low income, although a higher income requires a larger μ than in Hinduism 
or Buddhism and a smaller α than in Judaism). 
 The analysis neglects indigenous religions in Africa (Olupona, 2006) and other traditional 
societies such as Native Americans (Grim, 2006), mainly because these religions are based on 
oral traditions and provide no canonical texts that can be used as the source of inferred 
parameter values. However, although these religions differ in many features, they suggest 
similar pathways for personal maturity, communal identity, spiritual ecology, and 
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cosmological contemplation; in other words, they are all consistent with sustainability based 
on precepts that are orally transmitted from generation to generation. 
 Recent changes of religions to account for the growing recognition of a global environmental 
crisis are disregarded (Tucker, 2006). However, because my focus was on the main shared 
precepts of a given religion, this should not be a major problem. 
Note that there are similarities among the most popular sustainability paradigms and religious 
environmental ethics. Weak sustainability (i.e., 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊𝑖 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑊F ≥ 𝑊C ) is close to Judaism; a-
growth (i.e., 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑖 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑊F ≥ 𝑊C) is close to Islam; de-growth (i.e., 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑋𝑖 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑊𝑖 ≥ 𝑤) evokes 
the approach in Christianity, although Max W is replaced by Min X; and strong sustainability (i.e., 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸𝑗) evokes the approach in Hinduism or Buddhism, although W ≥ w is replaced by 
Max W. 
The main strengths of the adopted approach are that: 
 The analytical model is simple but comprehensive (i.e., it includes all relevant features) and it 
is realistic (i.e., it can be validated with observed data), so its insights depend on the 
application of formulas inferred from core religious texts and the use of parameter values 
based on real data (e.g., Islamic principles show different feasibility, consistency, and 
effectiveness with parameter values that characterise Muslim countries today, as pre-industrial 
economies, and could be modified to characterise Muslim countries tomorrow, as industrial 
economies). 
 The framework is based on original precepts from each religion, without relying on past 
alternative interpretations and without requiring future interactions between religions. In other 
words, for the sake of realism, we should avoid sustainability achievements that rely on 
impossible (in the short-run) and implausible (in the long-run) compromises between 
religions to cope with an urgent issue. However, my analysis suggests potential directions of 
fruitful dialog between religions (i.e., positive interactions) by identifying parameter areas 
that are shared by some religions (e.g., both Judaism and Islam should increase involvement 
in a community, with μ ≥ 30, whereas both Hinduism or Buddhism and Judaism should 
decrease consumerism, with α ≤ 0.5). It also suggests potential directions of unfruitful dialog 
between religions (i.e., negative interactions) by identifying principles that should not be 
adopted by other religions (e.g., Hinduism should not increase α, and Islam should not 
increase μ). For example, Judaism could increase μ and decrease α by learning from 
Hinduism or Buddhism; by contrast, Hinduism or Buddhism and Islam should not increase 
consumerism by learning from Judaism. 
 The framework refers to community involvement, without relying on the extension of 
religious ethical principles to other communities. In other words, to avoid unproductive 
debate that would delay efforts to achieve sustainability, some variations among the sects or 
subdivisions of a given religion (e.g., the dozens of Christian denominations) should prevent 
the imposition of different interpretations of the same sacred text on environmental ethics. 
However, the analysis suggests which beliefs should be changed to achieve sustainability for 
some religions (e.g., Christianity should adopt the Eastern Orthodox principles by replacing e 
with θ as the constraint). 
 The analysis identified potentials and difficulties in achieving sustainability for the main 
religions, without requiring an extension of precepts and proscriptions of one religion to other 
religions. In other words, to avoid the potential for violence, imposition of principles from 
one religion on other religions should be prevented. However, in order to account for modern 
multicultural societies, I discussed the potential applicability of principles characterising the 
interaction between a religion and the level of industrial development in its host society (e.g., 
Islam is unfeasible in post-industrial economies, whereas Judaism is ineffective in pre-
industrial economies). 
Note that future technological developments (e.g., genetic engineering) might challenge some 
religious environmental principles (e.g., stewardship of past or current biodiversity) and might 
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affect species conservation practices (e.g., if technology lets us record the genetic map of a species 
and regenerate that species whenever we desire, conservation of that species becomes less 
important). Moreover, believing in the intrinsic value of nature does not mean that it has a fixed 
value. For example, a static perspective based on resistance to change could produce different 
values than a dynamic perspective based on resilience against change, fitness, or diversity. 
However, the concept of the environment as a form of bonding social capital is broad enough to 
include both a static perspective (e.g., Judaism) and a dynamic perspective (e.g., Daoism). Finally, 
the acceptance of scientific findings (e.g., evolution) might affect the foundations of some religious 
principles such as the sanctity of nature. 
7. Conclusions 
Many examples of bad local environmental management can be observed in the past. 
However, the world now faces serious global environmental issues. The main question underlying 
this paper is whether each religion can respond to these issues in a way that will favour global 
sustainability based on its unique combination of ethical precepts applied at a community level. In 
particular, there seems to be no perception that all religions should adopt a common code of 
religious environmental ethics to be applied universally to achieve global sustainability, since my 
analysis identified few precepts unique to each religion that could motivate people to take action. 
Moreover, although religion might not be the optimal solution for global environmental issues, 
sacred texts, regardless of their divine origin, represent the major source of values by which 
individuals and societies rank possible outcomes and make decisions. On this basis, religions could 
help educate children to be better environmentalists and less consumerist, since religions can rely 
on additional tools such as the concept of sin or the prospect of an afterlife to mould behaviours, 
and can also implement social sanctions within a religious community. Finally, there seems to be no 
need for religious ethics to enter the realm of politics to achieve global sustainability, since around 
85% of the world’s people claim to believe in some religion and its principles 
(www.adherents.com). In other words, although religions have only recently begun to explicitly 
deal with environmental issues (e.g., the first Christian symposium on the environment occurred in 
2002), religions can continue to promote transformation of beliefs and attitudes into values and 
practices that are more likely to lead us to sustainability. Such an approach can support decision-
making under the uncertainty characterising environmental issues where secular principles such as 
justice or responsibility are inadequate or unfeasible. 
The main answer obtained by this paper is that the principles of parsimony and trusteeship in 
Islam and the principle of equilibrium in Hinduism and Buddhism can promote sustainability for 
the majority of the global population (i.e., for the 62.9% of the population who belong to these 
religions). However, to achieve this goal, Muslim countries must maintain a small use of the 
environment, and Hindu or Buddhist countries must continue to attach a small relative value to 
consumption. Note that an increase in the perceived dignity of non-humans in Hinduism or 
Buddhism and the adoption of greener technology by Muslim countries can reinforce the stability of 
these sustainability solutions. 
Unfortunately, the analysis identified three main negative consequences. First, the principle of 
stewardship in Judaism is ineffective at the currently unsustainable levels of use of the environment 
in Israel, since achieving sustainability would require a much smaller importance attached to 
consumption (i.e., the opposite of the modern Western life-style), a large sanctity of nature (i.e., as 
opposed to belief in evolution and in opposition to Jewish precepts), and a significant population 
decrease, which is a very sensitive point to a people who have been repeatedly threatened with 
extinction. However, Judaism accounts for only 0.2% of the global population, so its overall impact 
on global sustainability is small. 
Second, my analysis identified no feasible solutions for Christians, which is consistent with 
the seminal paper by White (1967). In other words, Christians (31.3% of the global population) 
must rely on secular feelings and principles such as justice and responsibility towards nature and 
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future generations, since Christian precepts (e.g., love of neighbours) seem to provide weak support 
for sustainability. However, this could be interpreted as non-significant bad news, since faith in the 
(mostly) high-income Christian countries is decreasing, whereas secular principles (e.g., aversion to 
intra- and intergenerational inequity) seem to be more and more important. 
Third, Islam (22.8% of the global population) is effective at achieving sustainability under 
current (pre-industrial) conditions in Muslim countries if it is coupled with a small use of the 
environment, although it will not be effective at the higher future income levels targeted by the 
development plans of these countries. However, technological improvements could be 
implemented, coupled with a stable and low level of consumerism. 
Note that my model does not directly depict people who claim to be believers but whose 
behaviour may not agree with the prescriptions and proscriptions of their nominal religion (e.g., 
Christian businessman). However, since sustainability is always an opportunity cost (and often a 
monetary cost), the effect of this contradiction is likely to be smaller if behaviour must change in 
the directions embodied in the principles that have arisen from the prevailing social values (e.g., a 
growing recognition of the need for inter-generational equity). Moreover, it is improbable that a 
global religion will arise that represents a compromise between religions and that copes with urgent 
environmental issues, and it is groundless that such a religion would be able to combine the 
alternative environmental ethics or different parameter values. However, if we rely on the effects of 
the principles that characterise minority religions, which sometimes account for a significant 
proportion of the total population, the cumulative effects may represent a possible route to achieve 
sustainability in modern multi-cultural societies. Finally, the model does not directly account for 
people who declare themselves to be atheists or agnostics, although their behaviour might agree 
with some principles of some religion. However, since religious principles are embodied in laws 
(e.g., Catholic thinking shapes the approaches of most political parties in Italy) and since individual 
behaviour is directly or indirectly affected by the attitudes of others within the same society, 
religious principles are likely to be consciously or unconsciously implemented by these people. 
Three main positive consequences were identified. First, it appears that requiring belief in the 
sanctity of nature is not crucial for achieving sustainability. Second, principles leading to 
sustainability exist in all of the religions I analysed (e.g., stewardship in Judaism, trusteeship and 
parsimony in Islam, equilibrium in Hinduism or Buddhism), and these are independent of scientific 
findings (e.g., evolutionary theory). Indeed, religious ethics must favour sustainability by affecting 
the behaviours of members of each religion, without requiring changes in response to scientific 
breakthroughs (e.g., Buddhism supports recycling, but does not specify the means). In other words, 
religious ethics cannot be taken as the source of an efficient environmental policy, but can support 
the development of such a policy. This is perhaps fortunate, since religions have proven to respond 
slowly, often over periods of centuries, to key scientific breakthroughs. However, this is a case in 
which science and religion can work together to achieve a better result than either can achieve 
alone: science has no inherent code of ethics, which is something that religion can provide; 
conversely, religion has no updated means to implement nature preservation, which is something 
that science can suggest. In other words, religious ethics can define goals (i.e., minimise use of the 
environment in Islam, maximise human welfare in Judaism, achieve an ecological equilibrium in 
Buddhism or Hinduism), and science can suggest how those goals can be achieved. Third, altering 
the dynamics of populations is not crucial for achieving sustainability. 
Note that insights obtained in this paper are based on current data at a national level applied to 
produce static analytical results. Future research should try to perform a similar empirical analysis 
at a smaller scale (e.g., at the community level), to account for differences among countries or 
within religions in specific social characteristics and exegetical interpretations, and should try to 
theoretically analyse the dynamics of different religions, to predict both independent dynamics (e.g., 
Islam and Christianity are evangelical religions, whereas Judaism and Hinduism and Buddhism are 
not) and inter-dependent dynamics (e.g., Islam and Christianity are less likely to coexist, whereas 
Hinduism or Buddhism and Christianity are more likely to interact). 
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Appendix I: analytical results 
In this section, I will analyse the three main religious environmental ethics that offer the 
possibility of sustainability in order to characterise the constraints introduced in Section 2 in terms 
of observable parameters. In particular, I will neglect Christianity, since the analysis in Section 2.4 
of the main text suggests that it can never achieve sustainability unless it follows the philosophy of 
St. Francis, in which use of the environment should be at a subsistence level. Moreover, I will 
combine Hinduism and Buddhism, since their precepts largely have the same consequences, 
although the precepts are differently justified. Finally, I will neglect Jainism and Daoism, since they 
both achieve sustainability by referring to use of the environment at a subsistence level. 
Therefore, for Hinduism or Buddhism, either α is decreasing in response to increasing μ: 
αHIN > 0 ⇿ μ < 𝑤HIN(θ 𝑚⁄ )  and μ < (θ 𝑚⁄ )
2λHIN;  αHIN < 1 ⇿ 𝑤HIN <  (θ 𝑚⁄ ) λHIN 
𝜕αHIN 𝜕μ⁄ < 0 ⇿ 𝑤HIN < λHIN (θ 𝑚⁄ )  (1) 
Or α is increasing in response to increasing μ: 
αHIN > 0 ⇿ μ > 𝑤HIN(θ 𝑚⁄ )  and μ > (θ 𝑚⁄ )
2λHIN;  αHIN < 1 ⇿ 𝑤HIN >  (θ 𝑚⁄ ) λHIN 
𝜕αHIN 𝜕μ⁄ > 0 ⇿ 𝑤HIN > λHIN (θ 𝑚⁄ )  (2) 
Where: 
𝜕αHIN 𝜕𝑚⁄ > 0 ⇿ μ < 𝑤HIN
2 λHIN⁄ ; 𝜕αHIN 𝜕λHIN > 0 ⇿⁄ μ > 𝑤HIN(θ 𝑚⁄ ) 
Note that the second set of conditions (2) applies if m is large (i.e., if humanity’s natural 
family is extended to non-human beings), if λHIN is small (i.e., the use of the environment is 
technologically inefficient), or if 𝑤HIN is large (e.g., in an industrial economy). 
For Judaism, either α is decreasing with increasing μ: 
αJUD > 0 ⇿ μ < (𝑤JUD 𝑛⁄ ) θ and μ < θ
2λJUD;  αJUD < 1 ⇿ 𝑤JUD 𝑛⁄ <  θ λJUD 
𝜕αJUD 𝜕μ⁄ < 0 ⇿ 𝑤JUD 𝑛⁄ < λJUD θ (3) 
Or α is increasing with increasing μ: 
αJUD > 0 ⇿ μ > (𝑤JUD 𝑛⁄ ) θ and μ > θ
2λJUD;  αJUD < 1 ⇿ 𝑤JUD 𝑛⁄ >  θ λJUD 
𝜕αJUD 𝜕μ⁄ > 0 ⇿ 𝑤JUD 𝑛⁄ > λJUD θ (4) 
Where: 
𝜕αJUD 𝜕𝑛⁄ < 0 ⇿ μ < θ
2λJUD; 𝜕αJUD 𝜕λJUD > 0 ⇿⁄ μ > (𝑤JUD 𝑛⁄ ) θ 
Note that the second set of conditions (4) applies if λJUD is small (i.e., the use of the 
environment is technologically inefficient), if n is small (i.e., the future population is smaller than 
the current population), or if 𝑤JUD is large (e.g., in a post-industrial economy). 
For Islam, either α is decreasing with increasing μ: 
αISL > 0 ⇿ μ < 𝑤ISL θ and μ < θ
2λISL;  αISL < 1 ⇿ 𝑤ISL <  θ λISL 
𝜕αISL 𝜕μ⁄ < 0 ⇿ 𝑤ISL < λISL θ  (5) 
Or α is increasing with increasing μ: 
αISL > 0 ⇿ μ > 𝑤ISL θ and μ > θ
2λISL;  αISL < 1 ⇿ 𝑤ISL >  θ λISL 
𝜕αISL 𝜕μ⁄ > 0 ⇿ 𝑤ISL > λISL θ  (6) 
Where: 
𝜕αISL 𝜕λISL > 0 ⇿⁄ μ > 𝑤ISL θ 
Note that the first set of conditions (5) applies if λISL is large (i.e., the use of the environment 
is technologically efficient) or if wISL is small (e.g., in a pre-industrial economy). In summary, an 
increase in α implies an increase in (λ E)α and a decrease in (μ/E)1-α: if μ is small (e.g., with μ < λ θ2 
at equilibrium for Islam), then the magnitude of the increase is larger than the magnitude of the 
decrease, so a smaller μ is required to achieve the same w level. In other words, in terms of the 
likelihood of the second set of conditions (2, 4, 6) (i.e., for α increasing with increasing μ), HIN > 
JUD > ISL, where condition 2 is met if m is large for HIN. Moreover, in terms of the likelihood of α 
decreasing with decreasing θ (i.e., stricter conditions in case of an increase in population), HIN = 
ISL > JUD. Finally, in terms of the minimum μ in the case of an increasing α, ISL > JUD > HIN. 
By comparing Hinduism and Judaism, one obtains αHIN = αJUD if ln[μ] ln[m] equals 
2ln[𝑛](ln[θ] + ln[𝜆] − ln[𝑤]) + ln[𝑚](2ln[𝑤] − 2ln[𝑛] − ln[λ]).  By comparing Judaism and 
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Islam, one obtains αJUD = αISL if ln[μ] = ∞ or if ln[μ] = 0. By comparing Hinduism and Islam, one 
obtains αHIN = αISL if ln[μ] ln[m] equals ln[λ](−ln[𝑚] + ln[𝑤]) + (−ln[λ] + 2ln[𝑚])ln[𝑤] . In 
other words, for a sufficiently large μ, the α for Hinduism and Buddhism is smaller than that for 
Judaism and Islam (i.e., it represents a stricter constraint on consumption). Moreover, if the second 
set of conditions applies to both Judaism and Islam, Judaism allows a larger α than Islam (i.e., 
Judaism is less constrained than Islam). Finally, an increase in λ implies a larger α for all religions 
(i.e., a looser constraint on consumption), provided the second set of conditions applies (i.e., α 
increasing with increasing μ). 
Appendix II: statistical results 
In this section, I will estimate the significance and size of the impacts of the four main religious 
environmental ethics on sustainability by relying on the same dataset discussed in Section 3 (i.e., 
145 countries) and the formulas introduced in Section 2. 
Table A1. Impacts of religious environmental ethics on EF (ecological footprint) (lnef in log), in addition to the 
per capita GDP (gross domestic product) (lngdp in log); budhin, isl, jud, chr are dummy variables identifying 
countries where Buddhism or Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity are majority religions. 
 
In particular, the formulas suggest the need to use a logarithmic transformation of dependent 
(i.e., ln EF) and independent (i.e., ln GDP) variables, and then to estimate a linear model. The 
dataset suggests a need to introduce dummy variables to identify countries where the majority of the 
population believes in a given religion (i.e., the number of Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu, Jewish, and 
Christian countries were 40, 8, 1, 83, respectively, with 13 countries that lack a majority religion), 
where the following Pearson’s r values were observed for these dummy variables: r(ISL, 
BUD/HIN) = -0.15, r(ISL, JUD) = -0.05, r(ISL, CHR) = -0.65, r(BUD/HIN, JUD) = -0.02, 
r(BUD/HIN, JUD) = -0.28, and r(JUD, CHR) = -0.10. Note that using EF as a dependent variable 
implies that negative signs in the dummy variables mean a positive contribution of a religion to 
sustainability. In summary, if μ is normalised to 1 for the sake of simplicity, I will estimate the 
following equation: 
ln 𝐸𝐹 = α (1 − α)⁄  ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃 −  α (1 − α)⁄  ln 𝑈 + 𝐵𝑈𝐷 𝐻𝐼𝑁⁄ + 𝐼𝑆𝐿 + 𝐽𝑈𝐷 + 𝐶𝐻𝑅 +  𝜉 
Where ξ are estimation residuals. Note that I expect a positive sign of the parameter attached 
to ln GDP, a negative constant, and a smaller value of the parameter attached to JUD, since ζ = 1 
implies that, for Israel, ln U must be replaced by ln U – λ θ (1/ θ)1-α. 
Estimation results are presented in Table A1. 
Note that there is no religion with a negative sign that is both strong and significant. In other 
words, the positive analysis developed here (i.e., which religion favours sustainability) must be 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.557305   .1013284   -15.37   0.000    -1.757649   -1.356961
         chr     -.000919   .0390526    -0.02   0.981    -.0781329    .0762949
         jud     .1084827   .1536622     0.71   0.481    -.1953348    .4123002
         isl    -.0384913   .0420894    -0.91   0.362    -.1217096     .044727
      budhin    -.0644674   .0638445    -1.01   0.314    -.1906993    .0617645
       lngdp     .4991936   .0241188    20.70   0.000     .4515065    .5468807
                                                                              
        lnef        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     13.821225   144  .095980729           Root MSE      =  .14871
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7696
    Residual    3.07382149   139  .022113824           R-squared     =  0.7776
       Model    10.7474035     5  2.14948071           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   139) =   97.20
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     145
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coupled with the normative analysis developed in Section 4 (i.e., how religions should change to 
achieve sustainability). Moreover, the ranking presented in Section 4 is confirmed here, both in 
terms of size and significance: BUD/HIN > ISL > JUD > CHR. Finally, the statistical results 
confirm the theoretical insights on Judaism (i.e., a less negative impact on sustainability) and on 
Christianity (i.e., a non-significant impact on sustainability). 
Appendix III: sensitivity analyses 
Figure A1. Comparison of the feasibility of religious environmental ethics for achieving sustainability, with n = 
0.9 (i.e., future population smaller than current population) and m = 5 (i.e., a small dignity of non-human 
beings). For the parameter constraints, μ ≥ 58.4 for Judaism (i.e., there are no feasible values of μ); for Islam, μ ≤ 
13.3; and for Hinduism or Buddhism, μ ≥ 3.2. Areas in the feasibility space: for Judaism, 0; for Islam (yellow 
and light yellow), 10.19; for Hinduism or Buddhism (light yellow and white area under the increasing curve), 
22.79. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Comparison of the effectiveness of achieving sustainability based on religious environmental ethics 
(i.e., the potential of each religion to solve the same average global environmental problem), with n = 0.9 (i.e., 
future population smaller than current population) and m = 5 (i.e., a small dignity of non-human beings). 
Parameter constraints: for Judaism, μ ≥ 25.2; for Islam, μ ≥ 22.6; for Hinduism or Buddhism, μ ≥ 4.5. Areas in 
the feasibility space: for Judaism (light green area), 8.93; for Islam (yellow, light yellow, and light green areas), 
11.95; for Hinduism or Buddhism (white area under the first increasing curve from the left, light yellow and 
light green areas), 19.07. 
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Figure A3. Comparison of the replicability of religious environmental ethics (i.e., potential of each religion to 
solve the same environmental problem in countries where the religion is a minority) for achieving sustainability 
in pre-industrial economies, with n = 0.9 (i.e., future population smaller than current population) and m = 5 (i.e., 
a small dignity of non-human beings). Parameter constraints: for Judaism, μ ≥ 14.7; for Islam, μ ≤ 13.3; for 
Hinduism or Buddhism, μ ≥ 2.6. Areas in the feasibility space: for Judaism (blue and light blue), 30.71; for Islam 
(yellow and light yellow), 11.91; for Hinduism or Buddhism (light yellow, light blue, and white area under the 
first increasing curve from the left), 26.03. 
 
 
Figure A4. Comparison of the replicability of religious environmental ethics (i.e., potential of each religion to 
solve the same environmental problem in countries where the religion is a minority) for achieving sustainability 
in industrial economies, with n = 0.9 (i.e., future population smaller than current population) and m = 5 (i.e., a 
small dignity of non-human beings). Parameter constraints: for Judaism, μ ≥ 15.9; for Islam, μ ≥ 17.7; for 
Hinduism or Buddhism, μ ≥ 3.2. Areas in the feasibility space: for Judaism (blue and light blue, green and light 
green areas), 16.81; for Islam (green and light green areas), 20.49; for Hinduism or Buddhism (light green, light 
blue, and white area under the first increasing curve from the left), 22.29. 
 
 
Figure A5. Comparison of the replicability of religious environmental ethics (i.e., potential of each religion to 
solve the same environmental problem in countries where the religion is a minority) for achieving sustainability 
in post-industrial economies, with n = 0.9 (i.e., future population smaller than current population) and m = 5 (i.e., 
a small dignity of non-human beings). Parameter constraints: for Judaism, μ ≥ 58.3 (i.e., there are no feasible 
values of μ); for Islam, μ ≥ 52.5 (i.e., there are no feasible values of μ); for Hinduism or Buddhism, μ ≥ 10.5. 
Areas in the feasibility space: for Judaism, 0; for Islam, 0; for Hinduism or Buddhism (white area under the 
increasing curve), 9.54. 
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Figure A6. Comparison of the replicability of religious environmental ethics for achieving sustainability in pre-
industrial economies, with n = 1.1 (i.e., future population larger than current population) and m = 10 (i.e., a large 
dignity of non-human beings). Parameter constraints: for Judaism, μ ≤ 5.2; for Islam, μ ≤ 5.7; for Hinduism or 
Buddhism, μ ≥ 0.6. Areas in the feasibility space: for Judaism (green and light green areas), 2.82; for Islam 
(yellow and light yellow, green and light green areas), 3.38; for Hinduism or Buddhism (light green, light yellow, 
white area under the increasing curve), 31.38. 
 
 
Figure A7. Comparison of the replicability of religious environmental ethics for achieving sustainability in 
industrial economies, with n = 1.1 (i.e., future population larger than current population) and m = 10 (i.e., a large 
dignity of non-human beings). Parameter constraints: for Judaism, μ ≥ 15.9; for Islam, μ ≥ 17.5; for Hinduism or 
Buddhism, μ ≥ 1.7. Areas in the feasibility space: for Judaism (blue and light blue, green and light green areas), 
21.86; for Islam (green and light green areas), 18.23; for Hinduism or Buddhism (white area under the first 
increasing curve from the left, light blue and light green), 22.37. 
 
 
Figure A8. Comparison of the replicability of religious environmental ethics for achieving sustainability in post-
industrial economies, with n = 1.1 (i.e., future population larger than current population) and m = 10 (i.e., a large 
dignity of non-human beings). Parameter constraints: for Judaism, μ ≥ 51.9 (i.e., there are no feasible values of 
μ); for Islam, μ ≥ 56.3 (i.e., there are no feasible values of μ); for Hinduism or Buddhism, μ ≥ 5.6. Areas in the 
feasibility space: for Judaism, 0; for Islam, 0; for Hinduism or Buddhism (white area under the increasing 
curve), 12.77. 
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